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The purpose of this paper is to examine the process and costs associated with biopharmaceutical 
firms undertaking an initial public offering. It discusses the direct and opportunity costs 
associated with this process. It shows the historical mispricing of firms and costs associated with 
biopharmaceutical firms going public over the past several years. Private biopharmaceutical 
firms need to be aware of the process and costs of going public in order to determine if these 
costs are acceptable, compare these costs (and benefits) with those of other sources of funding, 
and better manage the IPO process. 




Privately owned biopharmaceutical firms seek to sell their stock to the public for the first time 
via initial public offerings (IPOs) for several reasons. These reasons include internal growth of 
existing or potential products and product lines, diversification into related and unrelated areas, 
as an exit mechanism for owners, and survival.1 Much has been written about the benefits of IPO 
pursuits by consultants and scholars. However, little has been made of the costs of undertaking 
an IPO, which is among the most expensive ways to finance a venture.2 This paper is written for 
new biopharmaceutical entrepreneurs who are seeking ways to finance their ideas, and who may 
be considering an IPO. It also may be of interest to scholars and laypersons interested in factors 
contributing to the costs of new drugs as these costs must be ultimately borne by the end user and 
society. This study is believed to be timely as the U.S. bio-pharmaceutical IPO market began 
heating up again in 2013,3,4 with 2014 seeing the greatest number of biopharmaceutical IPOs and 
greatest amount of proceeds overall raised ever.5  
 
As the majority of biopharmaceutical entrepreneurs have a science background and may 
not be familiar with all aspects of financing a new firm,6 this paper is offered as a partial guide to 
the IPO process and its associated costs. This lack of knowledge is not limited to scientist-
entrepreneurs. For example, a recent survey of chief financial officers of firms going public in all 
industries found nearly a quarter of these executives surprised by the costs associated with their 
own firm going public and almost fifty percent stated that the cost of their IPO exceeded their 
expectations.7 The present study provides data pertaining to the costs of recent 
biopharmaceutical IPOs (with comparisons to the costs of other IPOs) in order for the 
biopharmaceutical entrepreneur to understand these historical costs, and perhaps, in the future 
compare with their own experience. Consultants and agents often state that a knowledgeable 
client lowers the time spent on a project and thus the costs of the service provided.8,9 It is hoped 
that this paper will act to inform biopharmaceutical entrepreneurs and others of these costs, 




The U.S. Biopharmaceutical IPO Market  
 
An initial public offering is the process by which a firm sells its stock or securities for the first 
time on an open, public market. A public market is a place, entity, or system that allows for the 
exchange of a firm’s securities or stock between entities and individuals. Examples of public 
markets in the U.S. include the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ (formerly 
National Association of Security Dealers Automated Quotation), and the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX, which is now owned by NYSE Euronext). Figure 1 shows the number of 
biopharmaceutical IPOs primarily engaged in the development of human drugs or technologies 
in the U.S. between the years 1997 through 2012. We examine the U.S. IPO market due to its 
size advantage comparable other countries10 and given its high level of biopharmaceutical IPO 
activity.1 
 
There were 227 biopharmaceutical firms pursuing an IPO during this time. One hundred 
seventy eight (or 78 percent) were drug makers and 49 (or 22 percent) were firms that made or 
provided complementary products or services to this industry. Drug makers are firms with the 
standard industrial classification (SIC) codes 2834 or 2836.11 Various websites were used as 
sources to derive the names of the firms going public. These sources included Biospace, Ernst & 
Young, Hoovers, and the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC). These websites included 
firms that were also engaged in the development of biopharmaceutical drugs or complements for 
non-human consumption (i.e., animal, industrial, or military). Firms pursuing biopharmaceutical 
products or complements that are not primarily for human use are excluded from this study. SEC 
filings were used to determine if a firm met this criterion. 
 




From Figure 1¸ two items stand out: the large number of IPOs in 2000 and then the lack 
of IPOs in 2008. In the late 1990s, biopharmaceutical firms began attracting venture capital and 
other investors in large numbers, which in part led to these firms ultimately filing for an IPO (as 
venture capital firms themselves need an exit vehicle).12 In 2008, there were no 
biopharmaceutical firms that were primarily engaged in human drug development (or 
complement firms) completing an IPO. This lack of activity was mainly due to the financial 
market crisis and the leeriness of investors of risk capital in the public markets.13 
 
The IPO Arrangement 
 
Figure 2 illustrates a generic IPO arrangement. On the left side of Figure 2, one can see the firm 
considering an IPO. The initial investors may include founders, angel investors, venture 
capitalists, other biopharmaceutical firms, and other investors.14,15 This stage is called the “pre-
market” as the firm has a limited number of investors and is not yet publicly traded.16 Founders 
are individuals (such as scientists) who were with the firm at its inception. Angel investors are 
individuals and entities that invest their own monies.14 Venture capitalists are individuals and 
entities that primarily invest other people’s monies, and actively engage in the management 
and/or governance of the firm.17 Historically, other biopharmaceutical firms have been the 
largest investors in start-up biopharmaceutical firms.18 The pre-market investors typically own 
both preferred and common stock in the firm. It is not unusual for these individuals and entities 
to convert their preferred stock into common stock at or about the time of the initial public 
offering in order to make their investment more liquid. Additionally, it is likely that public 
investors (who buy common shares) would not want preferred shares of the company to continue 
once the company is public. 
 





Pre-market investors usually do not sell their securities directly to the public at large, but 
rather go through middlemen known as investment bankers or underwriters. Typically, several 
different investment banks work together to bring a firm’s stock to a public market. This is a 
form of syndication with one firm taking the lead.19 The lead investment bank also is called the 
lead underwriter or book runner. There are two basic types of arrangements that investment 
banks enter into with new ventures seeking to sell their stock: firm commitment contracts and 
best effort contracts.20 Speaking generally, in a firm commitment contract the underwriter 
guarantees to sell a certain number of shares of the stock at a set price. In a best effort contract, 
the investment bank does not.  
 
As investment banks are middlemen, they are looking to sell the firm’s stock in a public 
market to individuals and institutions. They must first determine what a reasonable price for the 
firm’s stock would be and how many shares of stock to offer to the public. They do this by way 
of a roadshow, which is where the investment bankers take officers and other investors of the 
new venture around to meet potential buyers of their stock. They can market the future IPO 
shares in one of two ways: the fixed price method or book-building method. In a fixed price 
method, the underwriter prices the shares based on the informal information gleaned from the 
roadshow. In book building, the shares are priced based on a similar process without the 
potential investors making a commitment to purchase the shares. It should be added that this 
process adds significant direct and opportunity costs, as it takes considerable time and effort on 
the part of the officers and others to carry-out these roadshows21—time that will not be spent on 
the operations of the firm or even, perhaps, in the discovery of new drugs or therapies. For firms 
going public between 2009 through 2012, it took about 9.3 months on average between the time 
the firm filed its initial registration form (S-1) and the actual date of its IPO. Due to the 2008 
financial crisis some firms postponed their IPO efforts. When 2009 firms are not included and 
one examines 2010 through 2012 IPOs, the actual time is about 8 months. It should be noted that 
for most, if not all, firms the actual process of going public started many months in advance of 
the filing of the firm’s initial registration form. Although it may slow down their time to 
initiating the IPO, firms may be able to lower some of their costs by spending sufficient time and 
energy in this preparatory stage.7 
 
The Fees Associated with Going Public 
 
Investment banks charge a fee for their services. The firm going public usually reports this fee 
(and others) as a subtraction from the gross proceeds that it receives from the initial public 
offering—what is referred to as the net proceeds. As long as the IPO closes, this fee is not a great 
issue. However, as in 2008, much time can be spent without a firm going public due to market 
attractiveness. In addition to the underwriters themselves, the underwriters and firm going public 
engage other external advisors to this process. Table 1 shows the underwriter fees and other 
parties’ fees associated with biopharmaceutical IPOs from 2009 through 2012. The data come 
from the firms’ SEC filings, typically their quarterly or annual report after the IPO. These data at 
times differ from those reported in the trade-press or in later SEC filings as some firms extend 
the IPO process beyond a given reporting period or may have pre-market investors receive IPO 
funding directly, but not the firm itself. Also, Table 1 reflects that some firms do not separate 





































as Percentage of 
Gross Fees 
 
Total Fees as 
Percentage of 
Net Proceeds 
Total Fees as 
Percentage of 
Gross Proceeds 
Cumberland 2834 5/1/2007 8/26/2009 85,100,000 75,200,000 6,000,000 3,900,000 9,900,000 7.05% 13.16% 11.63% 
Talecris  2834 7/27/2007 9/30/2009 554,700,000 519,700,000 30,000,000 5,000,000 35,000,000 5.41% 6.73% 6.31% 
Omeros 2834 1/9/2008 10/8/2009 68,200,000 61,800,000 4,800,000 1,600,000 6,400,000 7.04% 10.36% 9.38% 
2009 Sum    708,000,000 656,700,000 40,800,000 10,500,000 51,300,000    
2009 Mean    236,000,000 218,900,000 13,600,000 3,500,000 17,100,000 6.50% 10.09% 9.11% 
              
Ironwood 2834 11/20/2009 2/3/2010 215,200,000 203,200,000 10,500,000 1,500,000 12,000,000 4.88% 5.91% 5.58% 
Anthera  2834 9/15/2009 3/1/2010 44,100,000 41,100,000     3,000,000  7.30% 6.80% 
AVEO  2834 12/16/2009 3/12/2010 89,700,000 80,300,000 6,300,000 3,100,000 9,400,000 7.02% 11.71% 10.48% 
CorMedix 2834 11/25/2009 3/26/2010 12,500,000 10,400,000 1,300,000 800,000 2,100,000 10.40% 20.19% 16.80% 
Tengion 2836 12/24/2009 4/9/2010 30,000,000 25,800,000 1,800,000 2,400,000 4,200,000 6.00% 16.28% 14.00% 
Alimera  2834 7/1/2008 4/22/2010 72,050,000 68,395,419     3,654,581  5.34% 5.07% 
Codexis 2860 4/14/2008 4/22/2010 78,000,000 68,000,000 5,500,000 4,500,000 10,000,000 7.05% 14.71% 12.82% 
Trius  2834 11/6/2009 8/2/2010 50,000,000 45,600,000 1,700,000 2,700,000 4,400,000 3.40% 9.65% 8.80% 
NuPathe 2834 5/14/2010 8/5/2010 50,000,000 43,000,000 3,500,000 3,500,000 7,000,000 7.00% 16.28% 14.00% 
Aegerion 2834 3/21/2007 10/22/2010 54,625,000 48,800,000 3,325,000 2,500,000 5,825,000 6.09% 11.94% 10.66% 
Pacific Biosc. 3826 8/16/2010 10/27/2010 230,000,000 210,400,000 16,100,000 3,500,000 19,600,000 7.00% 9.32% 8.52% 
Complete  8731 7/30/2010 11/11/2010 54,000,000 47,000,000   7,000,000  14.89% 12.96% 
Anacor  2834 8/31/2007 11/24/2010 66,900,000 61,000,000 3,200,000 2,700,000 5,900,000 4.78% 9.67% 8.82% 
Ventrus  2834 7/20/2010 12/23/2010 16,961,500 15,700,000     1,261,500  8.04% 7.44% 
Zogenix 2834 3/20/2008 12/23/2010 57,700,000 51,700,000 2,700,000 3,300,000 6,000,000 4.68% 11.61% 10.40% 
2010 Sum    1,121,736,500 1,020,395,419 55,925,000 30,500,000 101,341,081    
2010 Mean    74,782,433 68,026,361 5,084,091 2,772,727 6,756,072 6.21% 11.52% 10.21% 
 
 





Pacira  2834 11/1/2010 2/3/2011 42,000,000 37,000,000   5,000,000  13.51% 11.90% 
Endocyte 2834 8/17/2010 2/4/2011 86,300,000 78,200,000 5,500,000 2,600,000 8,100,000 6.37% 10.36% 9.39% 
BG Medicine 2835 8/3/2007 2/4/2011 40,200,000 34,800,000 2,800,000 2,600,000 5,400,000 6.97% 15.52% 13.43% 
Fluidigm  3826 4/14/2008 2/10/2011 83,000,000 77,000,000   6,000,000  7.79% 7.23% 
Acelrx  2834 11/12/2010 3/11/2011 40,000,000 35,200,000   4,800,000  13.64% 12.00% 
Tranzyme 2834 11/19/2010 4/4/2011 57,400,000 51,400,000   6,000,000  11.67% 10.45% 
Horizon Pharm 2834 8/3/2010 7/28/2011 49,500,000 41,900,000 3,500,000 4,100,000 7,600,000 7.07% 18.14% 15.35% 
NewLink Gen. 2834 12/21/2010 11/11/2011 43,400,000 37,500,000 3,000,000 2,900,000 5,900,000 6.91% 15.73% 13.59% 
Clovis Onc. 2834 6/23/2011 11/17/2011 139,100,000 129,400,000 6,900,000 2,800,000 9,700,000 4.96% 7.50% 6.97% 
2011 Sum    580,900,000 522,400,000 21,700,000 15,000,000 58,500,000    
2011 Mean    64,544,444 58,044,444 4,340,000 3,000,000 6,500,000 6.46% 12.65% 11.15% 
            
Merrimack Ph. 
 
2834 7/8/2011 3/29/12 105,300,000 100,500,000   4,800,000  4.78% 4.56% 
Supernus  2834 12/23/2010 5/1/2012 50,900,000 47,600,000   3,300,000  6.93% 6.48% 
Tesaro 2834 3/23/2012 6/28/2012 81,000,000 72,600,000 5,700,000 2,700,000 8,400,000 7.04% 11.57% 10.37% 
Durata Ther. 2834 3/22/2012 7/19/2012 78,500,000 73,900,000   4,600,000  6.22% 5.86% 
Hyperion Ther. 2834 4/13/2012 7/26/2012 57,500,000 51,200,000 4,000,000 2,300,000 6,300,000 6.96% 12.30% 10.96% 
Regulus Ther. 2834 8/17/2012 10/9/2012 50,900,000 44,900,000 3,400,000 2,600,000 6,000,000 6.68% 13.36% 11.79% 
Intercept  2834 9/4/2012 10/11/12 86,300,000 78,700,000 6,100,000 1,500,000 7,600,000 7.07% 9.66% 8.81% 
Kythera  2834 5/17/2012 10/16/2012 81,000,000 72,600,000   8,400,000  11.57% 10.37% 
Atossa  3841 3/30/2010 11/9/2012 4,000,000 3,000,000   1,000,000  33.33% 25.00% 
2012 Sum    595,400,000 545,000,000 19,200,000 9,100,000 50,400,000    
2012 Mean    66,155,556 60,555,556 4,800,000 2,275,000 5,600,000 6.94% 12.19% 10.47% 
            
Overall Sum    3,006,036,500 2,744,495,419 137,625,000 65,100,000 261,541,081    





From Table 1 one can see that biopharmaceutical IPOs raised about $3 billion in total 
from 2009 through 2012. The average firm reported receiving gross proceeds of almost $83.5 
million. The average firm paid a little under $7.3 million in fees to underwriters and others, 
which meant that the firm received about $76.2 million on average in net proceeds from the IPO. 
When examining only the firms that separated underwriting fees from other fees, one can see that 
the average firm paid underwriters just under $6 million and others about $2.8 million—this 
combined figure is higher than the total fees figure and may be due to some of the larger IPOs 
reporting their fees separately. Overall, firms paid underwriters and others about 10.4 percent of 
the gross proceeds from the IPO or about 11.9 percent of the net proceeds from the IPO. For 
firms that separated the underwriter fees from other fees, these firms paid underwriters about 6.4 
percent of the gross proceeds of the IPO. This compares with the results of a study of 380 IPOs 
from all industries between January 1, 2009, and June 30, 2012 by PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC) which found underwriters receiving between 5.5 and 6.9 percent of gross proceeds.7 
As one can see from Figure 2 and Table 1, other entities receive fees for their services. 
These entities include consultants who assist with the roadshow and also other consultants who 
assist with executive compensation. Legal fees typically are quite extensive as firms require 
general counsel advice for all contractual arrangements, with firms often receiving separate legal 
advice about the IPO process itself. Accountants also play a vital role. The above-mentioned 
PWC study found legal fees range from $100 thousand to $17 million and auditor fees ranging 
from zero to $5 million.7  A sub-sample by PWC of 31 IPOs found that all non-underwriter costs 
ranged from 23 to 61 percent of all fees, with larger IPOs in terms of amount raised being 
associated with a smaller percentage of non-underwriter fees. The present biopharmaceutical 
study found total non-underwriter fees averaging about 38 percent of all fees, and ranging from 
12.5 percent to 61 percent. Similar to PWC’s results, the results indicate larger firms being 
associated with smaller percentages of non-underwriter fees. Our results differ in that several 
firms had lower non-underwriter percentages suggesting that several of the biopharmaceutical 
firms had larger underwriter fees than the general population of IPOs surveyed by PWC. This 
may be an area that biopharmaceutical firms may wish examine further in the future.  
 
To further elaborate on fees Table 2 is offered. Table 2 shows a detailed estimate of the 
non-underwriter fees paid by Pacific Biosciences. There was a $16,399 registration-filing fee 
with the SEC. Pacific Biosciences also paid the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA) a fee of $23,500. FINRA is an independent regulator of security firms. FINRA reviews 
and approves all underwriting arrangements. In Pacific Biosciences’ case, this would be the 
arrangement among it and JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank Securities, and Piper 
Jaffray. Pacific Biosciences is also responsible for a listing fee with the NASDAQ Global 
Market of $275,000. Legal fees total $1,500,000, and accounting fees amount to $950,000. Each 
security sold in a state is also subject to registration in that state and must pay a fee. This is 
known as Blue Sky Qualification Fees and Expenses and in the case of Pacific Biosciences 
amounts to $25,000. IPOs also hire outside entities to keep up with whom the firm’s 
shareholders are, their stock positions, and to provide them with certain recordkeeping activity 
associated with these new shareholders. This is reflected in the transfer agent and registration 
fees of $30,000. IPOs may also have other expenses. Pacific Biosciences accounts for this under 
the category of miscellaneous expenses of over $480,000. These other expenses may include a 
public relations firm, among others. 
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Table 2. Other fees associated with Pacific Biosciences IPO 
Security & Exchange Commission Fee $ 16,399 
FINRA Fee  23,500 
NASDAQ Listing Fee  275,000 
Printing and Engraving Fees  200,000 
Legal Fees  1,500,000 
Accounting Fees  950,000 
Blue Sky Qualification Fees  25,000 
Transfer Agent & Registrar Fees  30,000 
Misc.  480,101 
Total $ 3,500,000 
Source: Amendment 4 to Pacific Biosciences registration statement;   http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1299130/000119312510231219/ds1a.htm 
 
The Opportunity Cost of Mispricing the IPO 
 
In addition to the time and effort to prepare for an IPO, it has been noted that one of the areas 
that firms going public have experienced the greatest opportunity costs is in the difference in 
price between what the firm sells its stock for (known as the offer price) to underwriters in the 
primary market and what the public market investors actually pay.22 Public markets (e.g. NYSE) 
are known as the secondary market. This secondary market relates to both the selling of stock for 
the first time in an IPO, and also where existing shares of stock continue to be traded. The 
difference between what the initial firm owners receive and what the secondary owners’ pay 
creates what is known as the mispricing issue, which can be a type of opportunity cost for the 
pre-market investors. In other words, had the firm gone directly to the secondary market with its 
shares, in what is known as a direct public offering, it would potentially reduce the opportunity 
(and direct) costs of underwriters. Direct public offerings are rare occurrences. 
 
 Mispricing can take the form of secondary investors paying less than the offer price, 
which is called overpricing, or when secondary market investors pay more than the offer price, 
which is known as underpricing. Underpricing is the predominant form of mispricing for IPOs in 
general23 and biopharmaceutical IPOs specifically.15 For various reasons not discussed here, 
firms do not get too upset typically about the opportunity costs associated with underpricing (see 
Loughran and Ritter, 2002 or Williams and Young, 2012 for explanations as to why this is). 
Nonetheless, underpricing represents opportunity costs. Figure 3 shows the mispricing of 













Figure 3. Biopharmaceutical IPO mispricing. 
 
N= 227 Negative numbers = underpricing (1st day closing price > offer price);  
Positive numbers = overpricing (1st day closing price < offer price). 
Source: SEC filings and finance.yahoo.com 
 Figure 3 shows the percentage difference in the offer price and the price at which the 
IPO’s stock sold in a public market on the close of the first day of selling. The negative numbers 
represent underpricing and the positive numbers represent overpricing. The average firm’s stock 
over these 16 years underpriced 13 percent, meaning the stock closed 13 percent higher than its 
offer price. As can be seen, much of this underpricing took place in the early 2000s. Mispricing 
ranged from one firm underpricing 385 percent (i.e., the stock price closed 3.85 times higher 
than its offer price) to another firm’s stock being overpriced 26 percent (i.e., the stock price 
closed at 74 percent of its offer price). One hundred twenty seven IPOs (or 56 percent) were 
underpriced, 80 IPOs (or 35 percent) were overpriced, and 20 IPOs (9 percent) experienced no 
mispricing. Loughran and Ritter found that for the overall IPO market (all industries) that the 
market underpriced IPOs around 7 percent from 1980-1989; around 15 percent from 1990 
through 1998; around 65 percent from 1999 through 2000; and back down to 12 percent from 
2001 through 2003.21 Separately, it has been reported that the overall market from 2001 through 
2009 was underpriced about 12.1 (similar to our 13 percent for the 16 years period of this study), 
with the past 50 years or so averaging an underprice of 16.8 percent.22 
 As mentioned earlier, in addition to the price of the stock, part of the underwriting 
process is to determine how many shares of stock the firm can sell in its initial public offering. 
An IPO is considered successful when its shares offered are all sold at a reasonable price (i.e., 
close to the offer price). Table 3 shows data related to 2011 and 2012 IPOs’ intentions and actual 
first day returns. The source of the offer price and number of shares to be offered is from the 
firm’s prospectus. Data related to first day trading are from finance.yahoo.com. 
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x All IPO 
Shares 
Pacira Pharm 7.00 7.02 0.00 1,710,500 -34,210 6.95 85,525 7.25 -427,625 -171,050 6,000,000 -120,000 -600,000 
Endocyte, Inc. 6.00 7.73 -0.29 1,458,000 -2,522,340 6.15 -218,700 8.34 -3,411,720 -1,815,210 12,500,000 -21,625,000 -15,562,500 
BG Medicine 7.00 8.05 -0.15 2,453,000 -2,575,650 7 0 8.58 -3,875,740 -1,937,870 5,000,000 -5,250,000 -3,950,000 
Fluidigm Corp 13.50 14.02 -0.04 2,676,200 -1,391,624 13.46 107,048 14.48 -2,622,676 -1,257,814 5,558,333 -2,890,333 -2,612,417 
Acelrx Pharm 5.00 4.55 0.09 1,899,700 854,865 4.51 930,853 5.09 -170,973 379,940 8,000,000 3,600,000 1,600,000 
Tranzyme 4.00 4.00 0.00 1,762,400 0 3.95 88,120 4.19 -334,856 -123,368 13,500,000 0 -945,000 
Horizon Pharma 9.00 9.15 -0.02 564,400 -84,660 9 0 9.20 -112,880 -56,440 5,500,000 -825,000 -550,000 
NewLink Genetics 7.00 7.08 -0.01 1,729,200 -138,336 7 0 7.81 -1,400,652 -700,326 6,200,000 -496,000 -2,511,000 
Clovis Oncology 13.00 12.56 0.03 1,912,700 841,588 12.29 1,358,017 13.39 -745,953 306,032 10,000,000 4,400,000 1,600,000 
              
2011 Sum     -5,050,367  2,350,863  -13,103,075 -5,376,106  -23,206,333 -23,530,917 
2011 Mean   -0.04  -561,152  261,207  -1,455,897 -597,345  -2,578,481 -2,614,546 
              
Merrimack Pharm 7.00 6.04 0.14 3,778,300 3,627,168 5.86 4,307,262 6.50 1,889,150 3,098,206 14,300,000 13,728,000 11,726,000 
Supernus Pharm 5.00 5.37 -0.07 676,900 -250,453 5.20 -135,380 7.01 -1,360,569 -747,975 10,000,000 -3,700,000 -11,050,000 
Tesaro Inc. 13.50 13.69 -0.01 1,266,200 -240,578 12.82 861,016 14.00 -633,100 113,958 6,000,000 -1,140,000 540,000 
Durata Therapeutics 9.00 9.04 0.00 1,848,400 -73,936 8.99 18,484 10.00 -1,848,400 -914,958 7,500,000 -300,000 -3,712,500 
Hyperion Thera 10.00 10.11 -0.01 399,800 -43,978 9.95 19,990 11.00 -399,800 -189,905 5,000,000 -550,000 -2,375,000 
Regulus Therap 4.00 4.38 -0.10 35,600 -13,528 4.24 -8,544 4.44 -15,664 -12,104 11,250,000 -4,275,000 -3,825,000 
Intercept Pharm 15.00 19.40 -0.29 813,300 -3,578,520 18.74 -3,041,742 20.40 -4,391,820 -3,716,781 5,000,000 -22,000,000 -22,850,000 
Kythera Biopharm 16.00 22.50 -0.41 100,200 -651,300 21.65 -566,130 25.20 -921,840 -743,985 4,400,000 -28,600,000 -32,670,000 
Atossa Genetics 5.00 4.05 0.19 51,900 49,305 4.05 49,305 4.69 16,089 32,697 800,000 760,000 504,000 
              
2012 Sum     -1,175,820  1,504,261  -7,665,954 -3,080,847  -46,077,000 -63,712,500 





From Table 3, one can see that firms averaged 4 percent and 6 percent underpricing in 
2011 and 2012, respectively. Jay Ritter has noted that IPOs oftentimes “leave money on the 
table”.24 By this, he means money not going to pre-market investors, but rather to middlemen. 
He calculates this money left on the table as the difference between the closing price of the stock 
on the first day of trading and the offer price, multiplied by the number of shares sold (or 
volume). This assumes that all trading is for new shares without any shares trading again on this 
date. Using Ritter’s formula, the 2011 firms left in excess of $5.0 million and almost $1.2 million 
on the table in 2012, cumulatively. This means that the average firm left in excess of $560,000 in 
2011 and $130,000 in 2012. One important aspect of Table 3 is that some firms’ underwriters 
lose money on their trading at the close of the first day of trading others do not. 
 
 An issue with looking at data in the above manner is the assumption that all shares sold at 
the closing price. They did not. Exact data for these firms are not readily available, but one can 
look at several other measures in conjunction with closing price data for comparative purposes. 
If one assumed that all shares sold for the lowest price traded on the first day, this would mean 
that cumulatively firms would not leave money on the table. Rather, they would gain above what 
the secondary market was willing to pay of over $2.3 million in 2011 and almost $1.5 million in 
2012. If one assumed selling all shares at the high stock price of the day, this would mean 
leaving on the table over $13.1 million in 2011 and over $7.6 million in 2012. Perhaps, a better 
indicator is an average of the high and low prices. This average measure indicates cumulative 
potential money left on the table in excess of $5.3 million in 2011 and $3.0 million in 2012 for 
these firms, with the average firm in 2011 leaving about $600,000 on the table and the average 
firm in 2012 leaving about $342,000. Although, most firms do not sell all of their offering shares 
on the first day, one can speculate that if they did sell all shares at the closing price these firms 
cumulatively would leave in excess of $23.2 million dollars in 2011 and $46.0 million in 2012. If 
one assumed they sold all shares at the average first day price, then this would leave $23.5 
million in 2011 and $63.7 million in 2012 on the table. Thus, one can see that there is 
opportunity costs in utilizing the services of investment banks and not pursuing a direct public 
offering.  
 
There are significant opportunity costs associated with a direct public offering as well. 
There is no guarantee that the IPOs in this study would have been able to garner these prices or 
sold all of their shares of stock without the efforts of the investment bankers23—in this sense 
underwriters add value. In another sense, underwriters add value compared with attempting a 
direct offering in that they assist the entrepreneurs in the navigation of all the complexities 
related to the secondary or public market and their associated parties (see Figure 2 and Table 2 
for examples of these parties). They also may have a better or closer understanding of the 
readiness (i.e., hotness) of the IPO market and when to go public. Perhaps the greatest cost 
associated with a direct offering as opposed to utilizing investment banks is the opportunity costs 
of having the firm’s executives spend a greater amount of time and energy on raising capital and 
away from developing new biopharmaceutical products and innovations. In other words, if there 
is no lead underwriter (or any underwriter) then the biopharmaceutical entrepreneur must take 







The IPO market for biopharmaceutical firms appears to be coming back.5 Yet, there are costs 
associated with an IPO and firms must understand the length of time, process, and associated 
costs of going public in order to act in the most efficacious business manner.7 Attorneys, agents, 
and consultants often appreciate an informed client, with such leading to greater client 
satisfaction,8 and perhaps, the lowering of costs and speeding up of the time to IPO. The present 
study found both similarities and subtle differences in costs when compared with the general 
population of IPOs. It found that underwriter fees as a percentage of gross IPO receipts are 
similar to the general IPO market as reported by an external survey. However, the study’s 
underwriter fees as a percentage of total fees are slightly higher than the general IPO market. It 
also found IPO underpricing to be not too dissimilar than the general IPO market as reported by 
external sources. The present study should help biopharmaceutical entrepreneurs and others 
understand the cost of going public in order to evaluate their options. For those who choose to go 
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